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Abstract
How quickly do listeners recognize emotions from a speaker’s voice, and does the time course for recognition vary by
emotion type? To address these questions, we adapted the auditory gating paradigm to estimate how much vocal
information is needed for listeners to categorize five basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness) and neutral
utterances produced by male and female speakers of English. Semantically-anomalous pseudo-utterances (e.g., The rivix
jolled the silling) conveying each emotion were divided into seven gate intervals according to the number of syllables that
listeners heard from sentence onset. Participants (n= 48) judged the emotional meaning of stimuli presented at each gate
duration interval, in a successive, blocked presentation format. Analyses looked at how recognition of each emotion evolves
as an utterance unfolds and estimated the ‘‘identification point’’ for each emotion. Results showed that anger, sadness, fear,
and neutral expressions are recognized more accurately at short gate intervals than happiness, and particularly disgust;
however, as speech unfolds, recognition of happiness improves significantly towards the end of the utterance (and fear is
recognized more accurately than other emotions). When the gate associated with the emotion identification point of each
stimulus was calculated, data indicated that fear (M= 517 ms), sadness (M= 576 ms), and neutral (M= 510 ms) expressions
were identified from shorter acoustic events than the other emotions. These data reveal differences in the underlying time
course for conscious recognition of basic emotions from vocal expressions, which should be accounted for in studies of
emotional speech processing.
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Introduction
Empirical descriptions of the cognitive system for recognizing
vocal emotion expressions in speech, or emotional prosody, are now
accumulating rapidly. Emotional prosody refers to how speakers
communicate emotion (intentionally or unintentionally) by
modifying acoustic attributes of their voice, and how these cues
are perceived and recognized by listeners. The neurocognitive
system for analyzing emotions from prosody is thought to be
functionally distinct from related mechanisms which process
linguistic speech information [1,2] and other socially-relevant
meanings of the voice, such as the sex or identity of the speaker
[3,4]. Like facial expressions of emotion (e.g., [5], there is evidence
that vocal emotion expressions are perceived and recognized in a
categorical manner during speech processing [6,7,8]. These
findings fit with the view that, due to the biological and social
significance of co-ordinating emotional behaviour in human
communication, there is a limited set of basic emotions which
have discrete forms of expression in the face as well as the voice
[9,10,11]. This hypothesis is supported by evidence that vocal
expressions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and happiness/joy can
be accurately recognized when listening to a foreign language
[12,13,14,15], implying that these emotions possess discrete
acoustic-perceptual properties in the voice which manifest in
similar ways across languages [16].
What is still poorly understood in this literature is the temporal
evolution, or relative time course, for recognizing discrete emotional
meanings from prosody. That is, how and when do changes in the
speech stream lead to familiarity and actual recognition of a
speaker’s emotional state? And is the time course for emotion
recognition in the vocal channel similar for all basic emotions?
These questions touch upon the very nature of how emotions are
encoded in the vocal channel, and how representational details of
these events are presumably activated to promote recognition of
discrete emotions as speech unfolds.
Decoding emotions in speech includes independent stages for
extracting sensory/acoustic features, for detecting meaningful
relations among these features over time, and for conceptual
processing of the acoustic patterns in relation to emotion-related
knowledge held in long-term memory [17]. At the stages of
conceptual processing, it has been argued that emotion-specific
knowledge associated with basic emotions is stored as separate
units in an associative memory network (e.g., [18,19,20]). These
representations can be activated by prototypical acoustic or
sensorimotor features associated with the emotion expression
when encountered in the auditory or visual modalities [7]. Data
show that emotion-specific meanings in speech are registered
implicitly and automatically by vocal cues [21,22,23,24], presum-
ably after a series of more basic appraisals of the incoming event to
determine its valence, potency, and other affective details which
contribute to emotional knowledge [25].
While informative, these details do not reveal how much
information is needed to recognize discrete emotions from vocal
attributes of speech. Understanding the issue of timing is critical to
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specify the cognitive system devoted to vocal emotion processing,
since vocal expressions are ubiquitously dynamic, dictated by their
temporal structure (and unlike facial expressions, cannot be tested
in a static form). Vocal emotion expressions are differentiated by
acoustic patterns, as opposed to individual acoustic parameters
[26,27,28]; listeners attend to both absolute and relative settings
(mean + variation/range) of a speaker’s vocal pitch, loudness, and
how other acoustic features change over time to form discrete
impressions about the speaker’s emotion as speech unfolds (see
[29] for a detailed overview). The dynamic interplay of pitch and
speaking rate for recognizing emotions has been emphasized by
several studies [30,31,32]. For example, based on a recent
comparison of English, German, Hindi and Arabic, there is
evidence that fear tends to be communicated with a relatively fast
speaking rate, high pitch, and moderate pitch variation, whereas
sadness is expressed with a slow speaking rate, low pitch, and little
pitch variation; acoustic differences in pitch and timing differen-
tiate vocal expressions of anger, disgust, happiness, surprise and
neutral utterances as well [16].
Thus, to characterize when vocal emotions are registered and
become ‘accessible’ for recognition processes, one must consider
the time that listeners are exposed to fluctuations in pitch, loudness,
and other representative acoustic cues which specify their
meanings in speech. (It is assumed that acoustic patterns
progressively activate conceptual details which lead to familiarity
and recognition of the speaker’s emotion state; for a recent
discussion, see [33]). Given variability in the underlying temporal
properties of vocal expressions, it is possible that discrete emotions
in the voice unfold at different rates, and are thus recognized at
different points in time, as implied by recent priming data [34].
For example, recognition times might vary according to the
biological significance of the signal to initiate a behavioural
response, such as vocal signals which indicate threat [35,36,37].
Unfortunately, while studies have investigated how quickly basic
affective details of vocal expressions, such as their intensity or
valence, are registered (within the first 100–200 ms [17,38]), there
is only a small literature which informs the potential time course
for recognizing discrete emotional meanings conveyed by speech
prosody.
Using evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs),
Paulmann and colleagues [38,39] have tested when emotional
meanings of prosody are implicitly detected, and whether these
meanings can be differentiated during on-line speech processing.
Paulmann and Kotz [38] presented vocal expressions in German
to 31 listeners who performed a probe (word) verification task
while implicitly processing emotional prosody. A systematic
reduction in P200 amplitudes was observed for six different
emotional expressions (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness,
pleasant surprise) when each emotion was compared to corre-
sponding neutral sentences, although there was no modulation of
the P200 component when the six emotions were directly
compared. These findings suggest that processes involved in the
acoustic extraction of vocal parameters, which highlight the
emotional salience of vocal expressions (i.e., as emotional versus
non-emotional), occur within the first 200 milliseconds following
speech onset; any differentiation of discrete emotional meanings
must therefore occur at a somewhat later stage of analysis [38].
This conclusion fits with recent data reported by Paulmann and
Pell [39]; in that study, 24 English participants heard excerpts of
emotional pseudo-utterances, lasting either 200 ms or 400 ms in
duration, followed by a facial expression that was emotionally
congruent or incongruent with the vocal prime stimulus.
Participants made a facial affect decision about the face target
[7]. Results indicated that listening to vocal expressions of anger,
fear, sadness, or happiness produced a classically distributed N400
effect on the face when congruent versus incongruent trials were
compared across emotions, in the 400 ms condition but not in the
200 ms condition. Since N400 differences in this context index
whether underlying meanings of the prosody and face are the
same emotion, these findings suggest that listening to only 200
milliseconds of emotional speech does not sufficiently activate
emotional meanings from prosody, although these meanings are
implicitly recognized when vocal expressions lasted 400 ms [39].
Related studies have also linked amplitude differences in the N300
component to initial conceptual processing of vocal emotional
stimuli [40,41]. These results begin to narrow the time window in
which emotional meanings of the voice are implicitly detected to
around 300–400 milliseconds of speech [4,17,40]. Interestingly,
this general time window fits with recent behavioural measures
reported by Pell [42]; when happy, sad, or neutral pseudo-
utterances spoken in English were gated from the onset of the
sentence to last 300, 600, or 1000 milliseconds in duration,
emotional priming of a congruent face was only observed when
vocal cues endured for 600 or 1000 ms, but not when the prime
was presented for only 300 ms in duration. These results imply
that emotion-specific details about vocal expressions are registered
and attain the necessary threshold to prime an emotionally
congruent face in the time window of 300–600 milliseconds
following speech onset [34,42]. This roughly approximates the
time window where discrete emotions appear to be recognized
based on the ERP evidence cited above.
However, the timing of implicit effects of emotional prosody, as
inferred from priming or other on-line measures, may not directly
correspond to when this knowledge is accessible for conscious
processing and explicit decisions about a speaker’s emotion. There
is a long-standing tradition for researchers to assess emotion
recognition using explicit emotion judgements, typically forced-
choice tasks, where participants must name the emotion conveyed
by the stimulus from a set of alternatives [16,43,44,45]. Forced-
choice tasks index processing stages leading to the activation of
emotion-related knowledge from vocal cues, as well as procedures
for strategically accessing and comparing activations of the input
for their presumed ‘goodness-of-fit’ with emotional language
categories (see [46] for a methodological discussion). While
forced-choice methods have known limitations (see [47]), this
approach informs much of what we know about how vocal
emotions are recognized in speech and still provides constructive
insights. For example, it is clear that specific emotions, such as
sadness and anger, are recognized very well from prosody,
whereas emotions such as disgust (or surprise) are recognized
relatively poorly from vocal cues [16,26,48]. While these
investigations do not speak to the time course of emotion
recognition, they firmly establish that when listeners are exposed
to relatively long speech samples (i.e., sentences of approximately
1–2 seconds in duration), not all emotions are recognized equally
well.
New endeavours are needed to document the time course of
vocal emotion recognition, especially data which can be compared
to existing knowledge derived from forced-choice tasks (where
‘‘recognition’’ can be defined as the ability to consciously reflect on
and categorize vocally-expressed emotions). One approach that has
been used successfully to estimate the temporal course of
operations leading to recognition of auditory events is the gating
paradigm [49]. Traditionally, this technique has been used to
investigate processes of lexical retrieval/word recognition and
phoneme identification (e.g., [50,51,52]). Recently, it has been
adapted to test how listeners narrow-in on discrete emotional
meanings conveyed by music [53] or in speech [54,55]. In gating
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studies, auditory ‘‘gates’’ are constructed as a function of specific
time increments, or linguistic units of spoken language, and then
presented to listeners in segments of increasing duration starting at
the beginning of the relevant stimulus, where the last gate usually
corresponds to the entire stimulus event (see [56] for an overview
of design issues). This task, which many consider to be a sensitive,
on-line measure of spoken language processing [57], yields both
qualitative information about how accurate and confident listeners
are about the presence of discrete emotions at each gate interval,
and quantitative information about how much acoustic variation is
needed to achieve different levels of accuracy, and ultimately, to
‘‘isolate’’ discrete emotions in the speech stream. For example,
researchers can estimate the ‘‘identification point’’ of specific
target meanings by locating the gate at which the target is
accurately recognized by a participant without further changes at
longer gate durations for the same stimulus [50,51].
The use of gating to estimate the time course of emotion
recognition in speech is still rare. In an old study, Pollack et al. [58]
reported that 60 ms utterances gated from sentence onset yielded
good recognition of eight expression ‘‘modes’’,including fear and
happiness, when listeners categorized these meanings from a fixed
set of response alternatives; unfortunately results of this study are
difficult to interpret due to sparse reporting of methodological
details and data, and because many of the expression modes of
interest (e.g., ‘‘objective question’’, ‘‘confidential communication’’)
do not fall within an accepted theoretical framework about
emotions). Similary, a gating study by Audibert and colleagues
[54] reported differences in how well listeners identify eight
affective expressions—anxiety, disappointment, disgust, disquiet,
joy, resignation, sadness, satisfaction—from monosyllabic words
gated at different locations in the vowel or consonant. While their
data imply that emotions such as ‘‘joy’’ and ‘‘disgust’’ are often
recognized less accurately than many other affective modes, the
authors caution about the small number of stimuli presented in
their study, and again, these patterns do not reflect the presumed
effects of discrete emotion categories on vocal emotion recognition
over time.
Recently, Cornew, Carver and Love [55] reported two
experiments in which they gated pseudo-utterances—Jabberwocky
sentences ranging in duration from 1.6–4.4 seconds—which had
been produced by a single actress to express anger, happiness, or
neutrality. Stimuli were gated successively in 250 millisecond
increments and then categorized by a group of listeners in a three
forced-choice task (Expt 1) or in a discrimination task (Expt 2).
Following Grosjean [49], the ‘‘isolation point’’ for each emotion
(i.e., gate where participants correctly identified the target emotion
and did not change their response at longer intervals) was
calculated to determine whether there was an advantage to
recognize positive, negative, or neutral prosody. Results indicated
that the isolation point differed significantly for each emotion as
sentences unfolded, with a bias for recognizing neutral sentences
quickly and accurately (mean isolation time across partici-
pants = 444 ms) followed by angry (M=723 ms) and finally happy
(M=802 ms) sentences. The authors concluded that there may be
an advantage for recognizing neutral, rather than emotional,
content during emotional prosody processing [55]. However,
given that very few emotions were investigated in this study and
that speech stimuli were not fully controlled in certain respects
(i.e., in terms of item length, the effects of lexico-semantic content
across emotion conditions), a more rigorous investigation of this
nature is needed.
The purpose of the present study was twofold: to document how
the recognition of discrete emotions in the voice evolves at
different points of juncture as spoken utterances unfold; and to
estimate the time at which each emotion is recognized in the
utterance (i.e., to compute its ‘‘emotion identification point’’). A
secondary goal was to characterize some of the major acoustic
features which differentiate vocal expressions of basic emotion at
their precise emotion identication point. To accomplish these
objectives, we employed the auditory gating paradigm and focused
our analyses on a core set of frequently studied basic emotions—
anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness—as well as neutral
utterances. Following previous researchers [12,26,36,55], we
presented emotionally-inflected pseudo-utterances to ensure that
listener judgements of emotion were based only on prosodic cues,
rather than linguistic information which could bias emotional
meanings during speech processing. Contrary to Cornew et al.
[55] who divided utterances into 250 millisecond time intervals,
we defined auditory gates according to a major linguistic unit of
spoken utterance, the syllable boundary [59], to capture how
emotional meanings unfold over the course of an utterance.
Defining gates according to linguistic units, rather than time,
allowed us to rigorously control the linguistic-phonetic content of
speech information presented at each gate across emotion
conditions, given that differences in speaking rate are one of the
primary cues for recognizing vocal emotions [29]. Since all
sentences were seven syllables in length, items could be gated from
sentence onset for presentation in seven distinct gate conditions,
where listeners always identified the emotion being conveyed by
the speaker in a six forced-choice response format.
Based on the literature, we hypothesized that recognition of
each emotion would systematically increase at successive gate
intervals, and that accuracy at the longest gate interval (i.e., full
utterance) would vary by emotion type (e.g., accuracy should be
relatively good for anger and sadness and poor for disgust).
However, we expected that emotion-specific differences in
recognition would be observed at much earlier gate durations in
the utterance, and that the ‘‘identification point’’ for many
emotions would begin to emerge for gated stimuli lasting more
than 300 milliseconds and less than 600 milliseconds in duration
[17,39,40,42]. No strong predictions could be made about
whether the identification point would be similar for all basic
emotions, although we anticipated that not all emotion types
would unfold at the same rate in speech [34] and that neutral
utterances would be recognized more quickly than anger or
happiness [55]. When acoustic measures are examined, we
expected that differences in pitch (mean + variation) would play
an especially important role in predicting how and when discrete




This study was ethically approved by the McGill Faculty of
Medicine Institutional Review Board in accordance with princi-
ples expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed written
consent was obtained for each participant prior to their
involvement in the research.
Participants
Forty-nine participants (25 male, 24 female) completed the
study after responding to an electronic advertisement posted at
McGill University. Participants averaged 22.3 years in age
(SD=4.0) and had completed an average of 15.9 years of formal
education (SD=2.3). All participants had learned English from
birth and reported no hearing difficulties.
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Stimulus recording and selection
The stimuli were digital recordings of emotionally inflected
‘‘pseudo-utterances’’ produced by native speakers of Canadian
English, selected from a perceptually-validated inventory. As
described elsewhere in full [16], this inventory consists of 30
unique pseudo-utterances (e.g., The rivix jolled the silling) which were
each produced to express seven different emotion types (anger,
disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, pleasant surprise, neutral). The
emotional expressions were posed (simulated) by two male and two
female lay actors in a way that was natural to the speaker as part of
an emotion elicitation procedure, followed by a perceptual
validation study (see [60,61] for similar approaches). Pseudo-
utterances were used because they can be readily produced by
speakers to convey emotions in the voice and strongly ressemble
the listeners’ native language, but they limit meaningful emotion-
related cues to prosody [12,26,36]. As reported by Pell et al. [16],
perceptual data were gathered on each emotional utterance by
presenting them to 24 English-speaking listeners; for each item,
listeners first identified the emotion of the speaker from the seven
alternatives (forced-choice format), and in a secondary judgement,
they rated the intensity of the emotion expressed along a five-point
Likert scale. These data were used to select a subset of emotional
exemplars which were highly representative of each emotion for
use in the present study.
For this study, we selected emotions in our inventory for which
there is high agreement about their status as basic emotions with
discrete forms of expression in the face and voice: anger, disgust,
fear, sadness, and happiness/joy [62]. Surprise was excluded for
this reason, and because surprise utterances are difficult to
simulate experimentally [16], meaning that our database con-
tained relatively few ‘good’ exemplars that would allow us to
control for other stimulus features of items selected for the gating
experiment. Corresponding neutral utterances were also included
to establish a context for interpreting responses pertaining to the
five basic emotions, resulting in a total of six emotion ‘types’ in the
experiment. For each emotion type, 24 distinct items (6 per
speaker) with the highest recognition rates in the validation study
were selected, while controlling for differences in the linguistic-
phonetic structure/length of items across emotion types (which
could affect timing measures and the value of gate durations
independent of emotion). All stimuli were seven syllables in length
and each pseudo-utterance appearing in the experiment had been
successfully produced by one of the four speakers to convey all six
emotional meanings at a perceptually reliable consensus level
(minimum 60% correct emotion recognition for the listener group
in the validation study). These controls ensured that the linguistic
composition of items which ‘‘carried’’ vocal cues to emotion was
identical across emotion conditions. Within each emotion
condition, the serial position of stressed syllables in the selected
utterances was also controlled, since English is a stress-timed
language, and stressed vowels could present local opportunities for
speakers to modify acoustic cues in the service of emotion [27]. For
all stimuli, the initial stressed syllable was always the second
syllable of the pseudo-utterance; the second stressed syllable in the
utterance varied, but fell in equal numbers on the fourth, fifth, or
six syllable of the pseudo-sentence (this was fully balanced across
emotions and speakers). To control for gross perceptual differences
in the loudness of stimuli produced by different speakers in the
experiment, the peak amplitude of all utterances was normalized
to 75 dB. In total, 144 items (6 emotions624 items) were selected
for manipulation into different gate durations. The mean
consensus of the listener group for the selected items, based on
presentation of the full utterance, was high for all emotions:
anger = 86%, disgust = 73%, fear = 89%, sadness = 90%, joy=
81%, and neutral = 81%. These values represent target recogni-
tion of at least five times chance expectation (14.3%) in the
validation study [16].
Gate construction
To document how discrete emotions unfold over the course of
an utterance, we defined our gate increments according to the
duration of each syllable of 7-syllable pseudo-utterances. This
produced seven distinct gate duration intervals in the experiment,
where items presented in Gate7 were always the unaltered pseudo-
utterances from our inventory which were chosen for being good
exemplars of each emotion category. Each of the 144 tokens was
edited using Praat speech analysis software to produce six new
stimuli which varied in the number of syllables presented from
sentence onset (Gate1 to Gate7, where the numeral indicates the
number of syllables presented to the listener from sentence onset).
While sentence onset was uniform for each item across gate
conditions (defined by the actual speech onset), each gate
condition had a distinct offset as defined by the corresponding
syllable boundary (this location was marked by auditory and visual
inspection of the waveform). This process culminated in 144
distinct items which could be presented in each of 7 gate duration
conditions (1008 items total).
To provide background data on our stimuli, each of the 1008
items was analyzed acoustically in Praat to summarize major
acoustic parameters of the emotional exemplars presented in each
gate duration condition; these data are furnished in Table 1. Since
an equal number of identical items produced by each of the four
speakers contributed to each emotion condition, raw measures of
fundamental frequency (f0) provide an accurate description of
emotion-related differences for this stimulus set. Table 1 shows
that there were marked differences in the overall duration of
exemplars conveying each emotion (ranging from disgust
(M=2126 ms) to fear (M=1270 ms)), which reflect known
tendencies in how these emotions are communicated in speech
[29,63]. Once these items were gated, this meant that the mean
syllable duration also varied as a function of emotion: anger =
257 ms, disgust = 304 ms, fear = 182 ms, sadness = 263 ms, hap-
piness = 238 ms, and neutral = 219 ms. Additional acoustic mea-
sures are reported in Table 1.
Experimental procedure
Each participant was tested individually in a quite laboratory
during a single session lasting approximately 1.5 hours. Stimulus
presentation was controlled by a laptop computer running
Superlab 4.0 software (Cedrus, USA). To mitigate potential
artefacts such as response perseveration [56], stimuli representing
each gate duration were presented in a duration-blocked format
which always began with Gate1 and ended with Gate7. At each
gate duration, pseudo-utterances representing the six emotions
were fully intermixed and presented in a unique random order
across participants. During the experiment, each utterance was
played a single time over headphones at a comfortable listening
level; after listening to the item, the participant was instructed to
make two judgements in sequence. First, the participant was
required to name which of the six target emotions was being
expressed by the speaker by selecting the corresponding emotion
term from a printed list on the computer screen; the precise
emotion labels used were anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, and
neutral (the positioning of emotion labels on the screen was
randomized and varied within the participant group). Once the
emotion of the voice was categorized, a seven-point rating scale
appeared on the computer screen and the participant rated how
confident they were about their emotional judgement for that
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instance (where 1= ‘‘very unsure’’ and 7= ‘‘very sure’’). All data
were recorded automatically by the computer and trials were
separated by a two second interval. Each block was preceded by a
series of 10 practice trials (which did not appear in the experiment)
which accustomed the participant to the sound of the pseudo-
utterances, the length of the stimuli, and the response format.
Participants were informed in advance that the sentences were not
supposed to ‘‘make sense’’ and that they should attend to the
emotion conveyed by the speaker. Participants were instructed to
choose the emotion that ‘‘best fit’’ what they heard whenever in
doubt about the speaker’s emotion. Participants received $25 CAD
after completing the experiment.
Statistical analyses
Analyses were performed on data from 48 participants (24 male,
24 female); one of the original male participants was excluded due
to a failure to comply with task goals. First, analyses examined how
accurately vocal expressions of each emotion were recognized by
the 48 participants at each gate duration, for the raw hit rates (in
percent correct) and once these data were corrected for individual
biases in the use of particular emotion response categories (i.e.,
through the computation of ‘‘Hu scores’’ [64]). These comparisons
reveal how accurately discrete emotions are recognized from
prosody for identical linguistic units processed over the course of
an utterance. At a second stage, analyses sought to specify the
‘‘emotion identification point’’ for each gated stimulus, by
calculating which of the seven gate intervals yielded correct
identification of the target emotion without subsequent changes at
longer gate intervals of the same stimulus [50]. This analysis
provides information on the number of syllables and correspond-
ing time needed to accurately recognize discrete emotion meanings,
and how this differs by emotion type. Finally, the estimated
emotion identification point of each exemplar was transformed
into its corresponding acoustic measures to infer which parameters
may be necessary for recognizing emotions, and how these differ
by emotion type. All comparisons were tested using repeated
measures ANOVAs (p,.01). The size of significant effects was
characterized by partial Eta-squared (n2Partial) and they were
elaborated, when relevant, using Tukey’s (HSD) post hoc
comparisons (p,.01).
Results
Recognition of discrete emotions by gate duration
Table 2 supplies the mean correct target responses (% correct)
and mean confidence ratings (scale of 1–7) of the 48 participants
when judging utterances representing each emotion type, at each
gate duration interval.
(i) Accuracy measures. Inspection of the raw hit rates in
Table 2 demonstrates that recognition of each emotion always
improved at successive gate intervals, although there were marked
differences in how accurately the six emotion expression types
could be identified from (otherwise identical) pseudo-utterances at
most time intervals. Even when participants heard only the first,
unstressed syllable of an utterance (Gate 1), emotion-related
accuracy differences were clearly evident, although these patterns
tended to converge towards the end of the utterance (with the
exception of disgust). Based on the raw hit rates, recognition of
sadness and neutral expressions was notably more accurate than
for the other emotions at early points of the utterance (between
Gates 1–3); in contrast, happiness and disgust tended to be
recognized less accurately than the other emotions at most time
intervals in the utterance.
Statistical analysis of the accuracy data was performed on the
unbiased hit rates [64] after correcting for individual bias in the
frequency of response categories used at each gate interval for each
of the 48 participants (response category usage across participants
is provided in Table 3) . Here, Hu scores denote the unbiased
proportion of correct responses observed for each of the six
emotions at a given stimulus gate, where a score of zero reflects
chance performance at that gate and a score of one reflects perfect
performance. These data were transformed (arcsine) and then
analyzed using a 667 ANOVA with repeated measures of
Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, neutral) and
Gate duration (1–7). The analysis yielded significant main effects
for Emotion, F (5, 235) = 121.29., p,.0001, n2=0.72, and Gate
duration, F (6, 282) = 386.51, p,.0001, n2=0.89, and the
interaction of Emotion and Gate duration , F (30, 1410) = 17.67,
p,.0001, n2=0.27.
Post hoc (Tukey’s) elaboration of the interaction first looked at
how recognition of each emotion evolved as a function of hearing
incrementally more gates (syllables) of an utterance. Recognition
of anger and neutral expressions improved significantly between
all intervals from Gates 1 to 4, fear improved significantly between
all intervals from Gates 1 to 6, and happiness improved
significantly between every gate interval of the utterance (Gates
1 to 7). Recognition of sadness improved incrementally but these
changes were only significant between Gates 1–2 and again
between Gates 6–7. In contrast to the other emotion types,
Table 1. Acoustic features of the experimental stimuli
(measured from sentence onset for each cell).
Gate Duration (# syllables)
Measure Emotion G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
Duration Anger 182 563 789 1033 1226 1467 1799
(ms) Disgust 183 625 867 1155 1412 1705 2126
Fear 119 363 491 649 790 979 1270
Sadness 198 580 781 1026 1227 1478 1839
Happiness 159 518 690 898 1080 1317 1665
Neutral 150 444 649 852 1017 1218 1534
Speech Rate Anger 5.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.9
(syllables/s) Disgust 5.5 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3
Fear 8.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.1 5.5
Sadness 5.1 3.4 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.8
Happiness 6.3 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.2
Neutral 6.7 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.6
f0Mean Anger 223 232 225 218 215 211 204
(Hz) Disgust 179 179 182 178 176 170 170
Fear 314 287 284 277 272 270 260
Sadness 199 196 192 186 183 180 184
Happiness 218 220 220 214 207 198 196
Neutral 160 159 166 163 162 157 154
f0Range Anger 40 119 151 168 181 182 212
(Hz) Disgust 34 93 128 152 189 185 223
Fear 28 89 97 132 130 132 182
Sadness 22 74 84 107 110 124 196
Happiness 26 86 95 133 131 159 196
Neutral 13 32 58 82 103 128 122
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.t001
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recognition of disgust improved only in the second half of the
utterance, increasing significantly between all intervals from Gates
4 to 7.
When recognition accuracy was compared directly across
emotion types at each gate interval, several patterns of importance
emerged. First, the data indicate that anger, sadness, fear, and
neutral expressions were recognized with comparable accuracy
between Gates 1 to 4; after this gate interval, vocal expressions of
fear were always recognized significantly better than all other
emotions (i.e., from Gate 5 to the end of the utterance). Second,
the data show that happiness was recognized significantly less
accurately than anger, fear, sadness, and neutral expressions up to
Gate 5 in the utterance; however, with increased exposure to
speech at later gate intervals (Gates 6 and 7), recognition of
happiness did not significantly differ from anger, sadness, or
neutral expressions (although all of these emotions were identified
less accurately than fear). Finally, disgust was always recognized
more poorly than all other emotions, except at Gates 1 and 2
where accuracy for disgust and happiness did not differ
significantly. These patterns, which supply new information about
how the recognition of discrete emotion expressions unfolds in
spoken utterances, are illustrated in Figure 1.
To briefly explore whether participant sex influenced these
findings, the 667 ANOVA was rerun with Sex (female, male) as a
grouping factor in the analysis. There was no significant main
effect of sex on accuracy in the experiment (p = .57), nor did sex
influence performance as a function of Gate duration (p’s..26 for
corresponding two- and three-way interactions). The interaction of
Sex and Emotion was marginally significant, F (5, 230) = 3.24,
p = .02. Post hoc tests indicated that there were no differences in
how accurately each emotion was recognized by male versus
female participants; rather, the pattern of responses to the six
emotions showed slight differences in accuracy when male and
female participants were inspected.
(ii) Confidence ratings. Gating studies of auditory word
recognition have analyzed confidence ratings as a secondary
measure of whether listeners recognized the target meaning
encoded at specific gate locations (where increased confidence
about correct target judgements is thought to reveal actual
recognition of the underlying meaning [55,56]. To examine these
measures in the context of vocal emotion recognition, confidence
ratings corresponding to all correct target responses were averaged
at each gate interval; these data are provided in the bottom panel
of Table 2, by emotion and gate. The mean confidence ratings
were entered into a 667 ANOVA with repeated factors of
Emotion (anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, neutral) and
Table 2. Mean accuracy (% target recognition) and confidence ratings (scale of 1–7) for 48 listeners who judged utterances
representing each emotion type, according to the gate duration.
Gate Duration (# syllables)

























































































4.8 (0.9) 5.1 (0.8) 5.4 (0.7) 5.7 (0.8) 5.9 (0.7) 6.2 (0.7)
Disgust 3.5 (1.2) 4.3 (0.9) 4.5 (0.9) 4.7 (0.8) 5.0 (0.9) 5.2 (0.9) 5.7 (0.9)
Fear 3.6 (1.2) 4.6 (0.9) 5.0 (0.9) 5.2 (0.8) 5.5 (0.7) 5.8 (0.7) 6.1 (0.6)
Sadness 3.7 (1.2) 4.8 (0.9) 5.0
(0.9)
5.1 (0.9) 5.5 (0.8) 5.7 (0.8) 6.1 (0.7)
Happiness 3.3 (1.1) 4.3 (1.0) 4.5 (0.9) 4.9 (0.9) 5.2 (0.9) 5.6 (0.9) 6.1 (0.7)
Neutral 3.3 (1.2) 4.3 (1.0) 4.6 (0.9) 4.9 (0.8) 5.2 (0.8) 5.6 (0.9) 6.0 (0.8)
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
*For correct target responses only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.t002
Table 3. Mean proportion of emotional response category
usage at each gate duration interval for the 48 listeners
(includes both correct and incorrect target responses).
Gate Duration (# syllables)
Emotion G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
Anger 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14
Disgust 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.17
Fear 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Sadness 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.18
Happiness 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.18
Neutral 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.t003
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Gate duration (Gate 1–7). This analysis excluded one male
participant who failed to correctly recognize any of the disgust
items (producing an empty cell for this analysis).
The effect of Emotion, F (5, 235) = 27.42, p,.001, n2=0.37,
Gate duration, F (6, 282) = 136.98, p,.001, n2=0.74, and the
interaction of Emotion 6 Gate duration, F (30, 1410) = 7.78,
p,.001, n2=0.14, were all highly significant. Post hoc elaboration
of the interaction indicated that generally, confidence ratings of
each emotion tended to increase as a function of increased gate
duration. At Gate 1, participants were most confident in their
recognition of sadness, which significantly exceeded their confi-
dence ratings of anger, fear, and disgust. In turn, confidence
ratings of these four emotions were significantly greater than for
happiness and neutral (which did not differ). At Gate 2,
participants were significantly more confident when they identified
sadness and anger when compared to fear, which in turn was
significantly greater than for disgust, happiness, and neutral (which
did not differ). In the middle portion of the utterance (Gates 3 to
5), there was a consistent dichotomy: listeners were significantly
more confident when they recognized sadness, anger, and fear
when compared to disgust, happiness, and neutral. At the end of
the utterance (Gates 6 & 7), there were no significant differences in
how confident listeners were when they recognized discrete
emotions in the voice, with the exception of disgust which was
always associated with lower ratings/less confidence when
compared to all other emotions.
Emotion identification points
Our first set of analyses established that the recognition of
discrete emotions evolves in qualitatively distinct ways when
accuracy measures/confidence ratings are examined over the
course of an utterance. As the next step, we devised measures to
estimate which gate interval is associated with the isolation of
discrete emotional meanings—i.e., the probable ‘‘identification
point’’ of each emotion within an utterance—to arrive at a
description of the temporal and acoustic features which corre-
spond to vocal emotion recognition.
Following previous methods [49], we examined the emotional
responses assigned by a given participant to the seven gated
versions of the same pseudo-utterance, from shortest to longest
gate duration. We then pinpointed the exact gate interval at which
the intended target meaning was correctly identified by the
participant, and did not change at later gate durations for that
stimulus. This new dependent measure, referred to here as the
‘‘emotion identification point’’ of the stimulus (specified as gate 1
to 7), was determined separately for each utterance when judged
by each of the 48 participants (6 emotions624 items = 144
identication points/participant648 participants = 6912 total iden-
Figure 1. Mean unbiased accuracy of the 48 listeners to recognize utterance conveying each emotion, as a function of gate
duration (number of syllables heard).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.g001
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tification points, or 1152 data points per emotion). Following
Salasoo and Pisoni [51], our scoring system allowed instances
when there was only one incorrect response following at least two
consecutive correct target responses in the gated series (for
example, the identification point of an anger stimulus with
successive responses of ‘‘neutral, anger, anger, anger, disgust,
anger, anger’’ was scored as gate 2). As expected in tasks involving
emotion judgements, there were many cases which did not lead to
stable identification of the intended emotional target, and these
were scored as errors.
(i) Frequency distribution. The distribution of (correct)
identification points for each emotion at each of the seven gate
intervals, as well as the frequency of errors per emotion (i.e., cases
which did not lead to stable identification of the target emotion by
Gate 7), are furnished in Table 4. The location of emotion
identification points within an utterance varied notably by emotion
type, although the most frequent location generally occurred after
listening to only Gate 1 (sadness, neutral) or Gate 2 (anger, fear,
happiness). Interestingly, this means that for sad and neutral
utterances, a substantial portion of the stimuli were correctly
differentiated from the other emotional meanings after hearing
only the first, unstressed syllable of the utterance (emotion
identification points occurring at Gate 1: sadness = 50% and
neutral = 43% of all correctly identified exemplars). Emotion
identification points for anger and fear occurred predominantly in
the first three syllables of the utterance (Gates 1 to 3); when
combined, the first three gate intervals accounted for 70% of
correct anger identifications and 66% of correct fear
identifications. In contrast, happiness and disgust were rarely
identified after Gate 1 and showed a more even distribution of
identification points throughout the utterance. Disgust tended to
be identified much later in the utterance than the other emotions
(most frequently at Gate 7).
The frequency of errors (i.e., instances when the target emotion
could not be correctly identified by the final gate of the utterance)
also varied by emotion type, with the greatest number affecting
disgust (26% errors) and anger (18% errors). Nonetheless, stable
emotion identification points could be calculated for the vast
majority of responses: 82% of all responses for anger (945/1152
observations), 74% for disgust (848/1152), 92% for fear (1055/
1152), 92% for sadness (1061/1152), 90% for happiness (1040/
1152), and 92% for neutral (1062/1152). Thus, analyses which
characterize the temporal and acoustic features associated with
emotion identification points represent an average of between 848
and 1062 individual stimulus values depending on the emotion
type inspected.
(ii) Temporal characteristics. As noted earlier, global
differences in utterance duration/speech rate play an important
role in how speakers express emotion, and accordingly, the mean
duration of linguistically identical gates presented in the
experiment varied naturally by emotion type (review Table 1).
These time differences are not captured when describing emotion
recognition as a strict function of the number of syllables presented
to listeners. To relate emotion identification points to the actual
time needed to recognize discrete emotions, the gate value
representing each emotion identification point in our data was
individually replaced with the actual duration of the corresponding
stimulus gate, in milliseconds. The new, duration-corrected values
provide an exact sense of how much time listeners were allowed to
process vocal attributes of an utterance when this promoted
accurate recognition of the emotional target (without subsequent
changes at longer gate intervals), and whether this varied by
emotion type.
A one-way ANOVA with repeated measures on Emotion
(anger, disgust, fear, sadness, happiness, neutral) was run on the
emotion identication point measures expressed in milliseconds
(ms). As this analysis included items which yielded a correct target
response, the male participant who responded incorrectly to all
disgust items was again omitted. The Emotion effect was highly
significant, F (5, 230) = 194.19, p,.0001, n2=0.81. Post hoc
Tukey’s tests performed on the cell means revealed that emotion
identification points for neutral (M=510 ms, SD=206), fear
(M=517 ms, SD=120), and sadness (M=576 ms, SD=205 ms)
occurred significantly earlier following speech onset, than the
identification points for anger, happiness, and disgust. Further-
more, anger (M=710 ms, SD=174) could be identified from
significantly less speech information than happiness (M=977 ms,
SD=187). Emotion identification points for disgust (M=1486 ms,
SD=258) occurred significantly later after speech onset than for all
other emotions. These relationships are displayed in Figure 2
which displays the approximate time window for recognizing
discrete emotions from vocal cues, when identical pseudo-
Table 4. Frequency of emotion identification points observed at each gate duration interval of the utterance and the frequency of
errors observed for each emotion (n = 1152 total observations/emotion).
Gate Duration (# syllables)





























285 (27%) 221 (21%) 129 (12%) 90 (8%) 71 (7%) 74 (7%) 1055 97
Sadness 530
(50%)
205 (19%) 116 (11%) 76 (7%) 42 (4%) 44 (4%) 48 (5%) 1061 91
Happiness 39
(4%)
195 (19%) 156 (15%) 189 (18%) 190 (18%) 145 (14%) 126 (12%) 1040 112
Neutral 453
(42%)
221 (21%) 145 (14%) 87 (8%) 58 (6%) 53 (5%) 45 (4%) 1062 90
Emotion identification points refer to the gate at which the correct target response was first recognized and did not change at longer gate intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.t004
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utterances conveying six emotion types are gated by syllable
duration.
(iii) Other acoustic characteristics. In a final set of
analyses, we sought to specify other major acoustic parameters
associated with vocal expressions of each emotion type at their
established identification points. For each stimulus, we again
replaced the gate value representing the emotion identification
point for that item with corresponding acoustic measures,
independently for each of the 48 listeners. The acoustic
parameters of interest were: mean fundamental frequency
(f0Mean, in Hertz), measured from sentence onset to the
emotion identification point; fundamental frequency variation
(f0Range, in Hz), calculated as the maximum – minimum f0
measured from sentence onset to the emotion identification point;
and speech rate (SpRate), calculated as the number of syllables per
second at the emotion identification point. These acoustic
parameters are considered central features which differentiate
emotions expressed through prosody [29]. While speech rate could
be meaningfully compared across items and speakers without
further normalization, f0 measures were normalized prior to
statistical analysis to mitigate individual speaker characteristics
unrelated to emotion (e.g., male/female voices). Following [16],
raw f0 measures were standardized separately for each speaker
using the average minimum f0 of all neutral utterances produced
by that speaker as a single anchor point. This approach allows
emotional utterances to be characterized across speakers and
recording sessions in reference to a stable neutral baseline, where a
normalized value of ‘‘1’’ always reflects a doubling of the speaker’s
characteristic resting frequency in a particular emotional
condition, when compared to the neutral condition for that
speaker (see [16] for further details).
Three separate one-way ANOVAs examined how each
normalized acoustic measure differed as a function of the six
emotion types at the exact time when each emotion was
recognized, at their emotion identification point. The effect of
Emotion was highly significant for each acoustic parameter
investigated: f0Mean, F(5, 230) = 3872.32, p,.0001, n2=0.99;
f0Range, F(5, 230) = 188.29, p,.0001, n2=0.80; and SpRate, F(5,
230) = 441.16, p,.0001, n2=0.91. Post hoc elaboration of the
Emotion effect showed that global positioning of a speaker’s
f0Mean differed significantly for all six emotion types at the point
of emotion recognition; from highest to lowest f0Mean, the pattern
was: fear . anger . happiness . sadness . disgust . neutral. In
the case of f0Range, post hoc tests revealed that disgust exhibited
significantly greater f0 variation that anger and happiness (which
did not significantly differ); moreover, expressions of disgust,
anger, and happiness demonstrated significantly greater f0
variation than fear, which exhibited significantly more f0 variation
than sadness and neutral expressions (which displayed the least f0
variation of all emotion types). Finally, for speech rate our data
show that fear was expressed more quickly, and disgust was
expressed more slowly, than all other emotions at their emotion
identification point. After fear, neutral expressions were spoken
significantly faster than anger, happiness, and sadness, none of
which differed significantly in speech rate. Figure 3 provides a
schematic illustrating the time course for vocal emotion recogni-
tion, along with prototypical acoustic properties associated with
this ability, for the six emotion types at their identification point.
Discussion
Recognition of vocal emotion expressions over time
Our initial goal was to document how the recognition of discrete
vocal emotions evolves over the course of an utterance, and to
compare these patterns across emotions. Several conclusions can
be drawn from the accuracy data and corresponding confidence
ratings of our listeners. Most generally, the findings confirm that
recognition of vocal emotion attributes in speech builds incre-
mentally over the course of an utterance, for all six emotion types;
this led to increased target recognition accuracy, and higher
confidence ratings, when emotional judgements were made at
longer gate intervals. This broad pattern implies that listening to
longer portions of an utterance tends to facilitate processes of
explicit recognition and the ability to categorize the meaning of
emotional prosody [54,55,58], at least when emotional meanings
are unambiguous and do not shift over the course of the utterance.
Of greater importance, there were marked, emotion-specific
patterns in recognition accuracy directly from the beginning of the
utterance (Gate 1), highlighting differences in the rate at which
recognition of each emotion improved from one gate to the next
(and sometimes the gate interval where recognition first began to
improve). Specifically, when accuracy measures were corrected for
individual response bias, our data reveal that anger, sadness, fear, and
neutral expressions were recognized at comparable, increasing
Figure 2. Mean recognition point for utterances conveying each emotion. Error bars refer to the standard deviation around the mean, and
shaded bars refer to the 25th and 75th percentile within the distribution of identification points for each emotion (minimum of 848 and maximum of
1062 data points calculated per emotion category).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.g002
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accuracy levels at all gates throughout the utterance, immediately
from sentence onset (Gate 1). The sole exception to this clustering
pattern pertained to fear; after Gate 4, fear was always recognized
significantly better than all other emotion expressions. In most
instances, recognition of anger, sadness, fear, and neutral
expressions increased significantly as each syllable of the utterance
was added between Gate 1 and Gate 4 (and often longer).
The temporal unfolding of happiness and disgust on recognition
performance was entirely distinct. In general, both of these
emotions were recognized more poorly from the voice at most
time intervals, approximating chance accuracy levels when
listeners heard only one or two syllables of an utterance (Gates
1–2). However, when utterances are gated, our data qualify that
happiness recognition increases significantly over the entire course
of an utterance (between all seven gate intervals); in fact, by Gate
6, there were no statistical differences in the accuracy or
confidence ratings of listeners when judging happiness, anger, sadness,
and neutral expressions (although fear was always more accurate at
long gate intervals). Thus, while our findings again show that
happiness tends to be harder to detect from speech prosody than
most basic emotions [13,65,66,67], they also demonstrate that
recognition of this emotion improves steadily as more of the
utterance is encountered, and is ultimately comparable to other
emotions when vocal expressions are relatively long (6–7 syllables).
This pattern contrasts with disgust, which was recognized with
the least accuracy and confidence from vocal cues at all speech
duration intervals (uniquely so after Gate 2). This result, which is
well documented in the literature [26,45,65,68], seems to reflect
not only inferior but a slower ability to recognize vocal attributes of
disgust during speech processing. Here, we noted significant
improvements in disgust recognition only between Gates 4–7,
whereas recognition of all other emotion types improved
significantly from the very beginning of the utterance, between
Gates 1–2. This suggests a unique time course for disgust
recognition in speech, which requires extended analysis of vocal
cues before it can be accurately detected. Quite likely, naturally
occurring expressions of disgust are more typical in the form of
affective bursts (e.g., ‘‘yuck’’ [69,70]), and/or may be better
conveyed through visual rather than vocal cues [26]. If true, this
could partly explain why listeners find it difficult to recognize
disgust when emotionally-inflected pseudo-utterances are present-
ed, as shown here and in previous reports [26,45]. Nonetheless,
our data emphasize that if listeners are given enough time, they are
ultimately capable of recognizing disgust at high accuracy levels
based only on prosodic cues of an utterance, since our participants
achieved a mean accuracy score of almost 70% in our G7
condition (where chance performance was approximately 17%).
Although previous studies do not allow detailed comparisons
about how emotion recognition unfolds over the course of an
utterance, they have invariably reported emotion-specific differ-
ences in recognition accuracy when full utterances are presented to
listeners, which corresponds to Gate 7 in our experimental design.
Here, our data corroborate that certain emotions can be
recognized significantly better than others from the voice when
evaluated in forced-choice experiments [12,14,16,43,45]. Our
findings may be considered robust as they reflect the unbiased
accuracy of our 48 listeners, who judged a larger number of items
representing each emotion than most previous behavioural studies,
using stimuli which are perceptually validated in the literature
[16]. Since our items were selected based on their perceptual
properties when full utterances were presented in a similar, forced-
choice validation study, the emotion-specific differences we
observed at Gate 7 are partly predicted by our methods for
stimulus selection (e.g., the disgust expressions showed less
consensus in our validation study that other emotions, which
was replicated in the gating experiment). However, this factor
cannot account for all patterns observed at Gate 7, such as why fear
was recognized most accurately from the voice, nor does it inform
patterns which reflect the evolution of discrete emotion recogni-
tion as a function of gate duration. The broader significance of
emotion-specific patterns in the accuracy data is elaborated further
in the General Discussion.
Finally, examination of both raw (biased) and unbiased accuracy
measures highlights listener biases which affect vocal emotion
processing, especially at early gate intervals. When listeners were
exposed to very short speech intervals (Gates 1–3), they very
frequently assign an emotional value of sadness or neutral to these
stimuli (review Table 2). However, correcting for individual
preferences in response category usage eliminates the apparent
advantage for detecting sadness and neutral as spoken language first
begins to unfold; rather, this appears to reflect a systematic
response bias dictated by the lack of acoustic variation which is
naturally observed in the first 2–3 gate intervals for all vocal
expressions. As shown in Table 1, critical acoustic parameters for
understanding emotion, especially pitch variation (f0Range),
require time to emerge but change rapidly in the intervals
between Gates 2–4. In the absence of emotionally distinctive, long-
term changes in these parameters when speech intervals are too
short, it seems that listeners identify the speaker as sounding sad or
neutral because these emotions are actually defined by a lack of
acoustic variation along several dimensions, especially for pitch/f0
[26,29]. These data serve to elaborate the claims of Cornew et al.
[55] who only studied neutral (and not sad) stimuli in their gating
study, suggesting that responses at early gate intervals do not
reflect a simple bias for recognizing neutral prosody. In the case of
neutral expressions, listeners may also be adopting a default,
guessing strategy when overt cues to emotion cannot be
recognized. We found that listeners were significantly less
confident when they correctly recognized neutral expressions, but
not sad expressions, at the early gate intervals; this implies that
while listeners could not detect explicit emotional qualities from
speech segments which were very short, they were simultaneously
unsure as to whether the speaker intended to speak in a neutral tone
of voice. These patterns stress that, despite controlling for
individual response bias in our analyses, accuracy measures index
a variety of strategies commonly used by listeners when categorizing
stimuli in the forced-choice response paradigm.
Emotion Identification Points
The second major question posed in this study was: where is the
approximate identification point for each emotion as listeners
process an utterance, and does the time course for recognition
differ by emotion type? And what major acoustic differences
characterize utterances at the very point where discrete emotions
are reliably differentiated? Answering these questions will serve as
a foundation for new studies which investigate the timing of
Figure 3. Illustration of ‘‘prototypical’’ acoustic features associated with utterances measured at their emotion identification point.
Each period of the sine wave represents the average duration of a syllable when produced to express each emotion, which are shown up to the
average emotion identification point for the corresponding emotion. The horizontal line refers to the (normalized) f0Mean of utterances, and the
waveform amplitude (shaded region) refers to the f0Range, at the corresponding emotion recognition point.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027256.g003
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emotion recognition during speech processing, and which establish
what acoustic parameters guide recognition processes.
Our results provide strong indications that the time needed for
listeners to recognize discrete emotions from prosody varies
significantly by emotion type. When all emotion identification
points (totaling nearly 7 000) were expressed as the time that
listeners were actually exposed to speech, there were marked
differences in how quickly emotions were recognized from prosody
in otherwise identical utterances. Fear, sadness, and neutral
expressions were recognized in the shortest time interval, with
accurate recognition of these emotions emerging, on average, in
the period of 500–600 milliseconds following speech onset. In
broad terms, our observations extend data suggesting that discrete
emotional meanings conveyed by prosody are implicitly registered
in memory in the 300–600 ms time window [39,40,42], specifying
that this knowledge is available for conscious processing somewhat
later in this time period (beginning around 500–600 ms after
speech onset). Also, our data for neutral stimuli correspond well
with those reported by Cornew et al. [55], who reported a mean
emotion identification point of 444 ms when sentences were gated
in 250 ms intervals (versus a mean of 510 ms here when utterances
were gated by syllable). Interestingly, explicit recognition of
emotional faces also appears to begin in the 500–600 time window
according to recent data [71,72].
However, similar to what has been reported for faces, not all
vocally-expressed emotions were recognized in this early time
window; anger took approximately 700 ms to recognize, happi-
ness took 1000 ms, and disgust took almost 1500 ms on average.
Given patterns in our accuracy results, it is not surprising that
happiness and especially disgust required significantly more
exposure to speech than the other emotion types for accurate
recognition, although this difference in timing remains highly
marked (e.g., identification points for disgust were nearly three
times longer than for fear). To some extent, our conclusions about
the time needed to recognize emotions from the voice are dictated
by how we constructed our gates, which were defined by syllable
duration rather than precise time increments. As the mean
syllable duration varied systematically by emotion type, gating
utterances by syllable duration may have somewhat inflated the
time needed to recognize certain emotional expressions (partic-
ularly those with long syllable durations, such as sadness and
disgust). For example, if the precise emotion identification point
fell shortly after the boundary of two syllables, our procedures
would have nonetheless added 200–400 ms to the estimated
identification point for that item (depending on the emotion),
when the precise identification time actually fell in the early
portion of the gate at which the emotion identification point was
defined. These factors could have exaggerated our timing
measures to some degree.
However, it is unlikely that this factor contributed in a major
way to our findings; we observed that fear and sadness both
required the least amount of acoustic information to recognize,
despite the fact that syllable durations for fear tended to be
shortest, and sadness tended to be one of the longest, on average.
It should be noted that Cornew et al. [55] also reported that anger
and happiness take relatively long to isolate and categorize in
speech (M=723 ms and 802 ms, respectively), in agreement with
our findings for these two emotions. Still, the absolute timing
measures we report for each emotion should be viewed as
estimates at this stage of analysis until further studies can elaborate
on these findings. In contrast, the relative differences we observed in
how quickly discrete emotions are explicitly recognized were large
and robust for these data; this provides the most compelling
evidence to date that discrete emotions in the voice unravel to
listeners at different rates, and are associated with a distinct time
course during speech processing.
Our report represents a comprehensive example of how
identification points can be calculated in the study of emotional
prosody recognition. In so doing, our data provided a unique
opportunity to relate the recognition of each stimulus to the
precise acoustic features available to listeners at their point of
recognition. Previous investigations which have compared emo-
tion recognition with underlying acoustic features of speech (e.g.,
[16,26]) have concentrated on whole utterance measures, which
do not directly correspond to the time point where recognition was
established which we report here. We observed marked differences
in f0 parameters of speech at the emotion recognition point: fear
exhibited a very high f0Mean and moderate f0 variation, whereas
disgust displayed a very low f0Mean and high f0Range. Sadness
and neutral both exhibited a moderate to low f0 mean as well as
low f0 range (sadness was significantly higher than neutral on both
measures). Anger and happiness both exhibited moderate settings
of f0Mean and f0Range (with anger showing a significantly higher
f0Mean than happiness). Differences in emotion recognition were
further informed by speech rate: fear was produced very quickly at
its emotion identification point, whereas disgust was produced
with a slower speech rate than the other emotions. Neutral
expression were produced significantly faster than all emotions
except fear, whereas anger, happiness, and sadness were all
produced at a similar, moderate speaking rate at their recognition
point.
The acoustic data we report, which correspond closely to the
estimated point of emotion recognition, fit acoustic descriptions of
the six emotion expression types when whole utterances are
measured (see [29] for an overview). Given this resemblance, it is
possible that our timing measures reflect the point where acoustic
patterns first begin to display prototypical or ‘modal’ properties
referring to each emotion, allowing accurate recognition of their
meaning (and once manifest, these patterns remain largely
unchanged throughout the duration of the utterance, as shown
by data in Table 1). Certainly, our measures underscore that
multiple acoustic parameters contribute simultaneously to how
listeners ‘‘isolate’’ discrete emotions in speech, as each of the
acoustic parameters of interest differentiated at least four of the
emotion types, but in different ways for each parameter. Uniquely,
all six emotion types could be differentiated at their recognition
point based on the speaker’s adopted f0Mean, indicating that
perceived voice pitch over time acts as a particularly critical
indicator of a speaker’s emotion state to listeners [26,30,63]. As
more research of this nature is undertaken, future studies will more
precisely show how emotion recognition is influenced by combined
changes in these and other, unexplored acoustic parameters.
Finally, as identification points are rarely calculated in gating
studies of vocal emotion processing, our data have methodological
implications for future work. While allowing estimates of timing,
defining emotional prosody recognition as the frequency of
emotion identication points occuring at each gate leads to a
characterization of how recognition accuracy unfolds that is
distinct from both the raw and unbiased hit rates (although the
proportion of correct emotion identification points computed for
each emotion closely mirrors the raw accuracy scores of the 48
participants at Gate 7). However, like the raw accuracy data,
computing the location of emotion identification points in an
utterance as we did here would be influenced to some extent by
participant response biases; this is why, for example, emotion
identification points for sadness and neutral occurred most
frequently at Gate 1; as argued above, these effects are partly
explained by response biases to choose ‘‘neutral’’ or ‘‘sad’’ when
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listeners are presented very short auditory stimuli which contain
little acoustic variation in the shortest gate intervals.
General Discussion
Intuitively, few have questioned the notion that vocal emotion
expressions, which encode meaning via patterned cue sequences in
speech, require a certain amount of time for listeners to accurately
recognize. It is therefore curious that few concerted attempts have
been made to empirically validate this assumption, by precisely
demonstrating how much vocal information listeners need to
consciously recognize discrete emotions as spoken language
unfolds. One of the unique insights uncovered by our data is that
there is a distinct time course associated with the recognition of
basic emotions expressed in the vocal channel of speech. Using a
gating paradigm, our data show that basic emotions encoded in
the voice unfold in qualitatively distinct ways and at different rates,
yielding marked emotion-specific patterns in recognition accuracy
as accumulating acoustic evidence of the utterance is revealed.
Until recently, much of the literature which informs the nature
of emotion recognition from the voice, and also the face, has used
behavioural methodologies and the forced-choice response format
(e.g., [45,73]). Forced-choice tasks, by their nature, characterize
‘recognition’ broadly; here, our task would have tapped early,
automatic procedures for analyzing the acoustic input, and for
activating initial representations of emotion based on the acoustic
evidence [17]. These operations, which may be uniquely registered
by many on-line tasks of implicit processing of vocal emotion cues
(e.g., [7,39]), are believed to preferentially engage mid- and
posterior portions of the superior temporal gyrus/sulcus, respec-
tively, at the neural level of analysis [17,74]. In addition, our
gating measures would index operations which promote explicit
cognitive evaluation of vocal emotion cues in relation to the
contents of emotional memory, and strategic mapping of this
information onto verbal labels that refer to emotion categories.
These latter procedures, which are necessary to execute explicit
emotion judgements in a goal-directed manner, seem to recruit
inferior frontal regions of the brain to arrive at a more complex,
cognitively-elaborated sense of the meaning of vocal emotion
expressions [75,76]. These latter operations are most susceptible to
methodological factors, such as the number or type of emotional
response alternatives in the experiment, social attributes of the
participants, and other task-related demands [77,78].
The specific emotions examined in this study—anger, disgust,
fear, sadness, and happiness—are all believed to have evolved
unique signal functions in human communication, which govern
how they are encoded and decoded [11,62]. Until now, evidence
that vocal expressions of basic emotion are discrete in their
temporal processing characteristics as speech is consciously
analyzed, affecting the time course of processes which lead to
the recognition of specific emotions, has not been conclusively
demonstrated. Our data establish that many emotions can be
recognized accurately from the voice after hearing only one or two
syllables of an utterance, although the actual amount of time
needed is highly variable by emotion type. When defined by
emotion identification points, recognition began to emerge, on
average, in the time window of 500–600 ms (for fear, sadness, and
neutral stimuli), but extended to 1000 ms and well above (for
happiness and especially disgust).
Since our timing measures partly reflect how well listeners
strategically evaluate the emotional significance of a temporally-
unfolding acoustic representation, they serve to elaborate, but do
not contradict, what we already know about the timing of early,
automatic processes which act on an emotion stimulus. According to
appraisal theories, incoming events are rapidly appraised to code
the stimulus for its valence, urgency, significance to the organism,
and other affective dimensions (see [79] for a recent summary).
The time course of early evaluative processes can be indexed by
sensitive, on-line measures with fine temporal resolution, such as
ERPs. In general, it seems that a preliminary analysis of the
perceptual/structural features of emotional expressions, which
allow their emotional salience to be detected (i.e., as emotional or
non-emotional), occurs within 200 milliseconds following stimulus
onset (yielding modulation of the P200 component for vocal
emotions [38] and faces [80,81,82]). Further perceptual and early
semantic analysis of the meaning of emotional expressions appears
to occur in the 220–300 ms time window, where early negativities
begin to show modulation linked to discrete emotional expressions
when compared to neutral expressions [40,82]. Evidence that the
discrete emotional value of the expression is implicitly detected
occurs approximately 400 ms following stimulus onset, based on
evidence of N400 modulations to emotional mismatches involving
speech stimuli [38,39] and facial expressions [82,83]. If proven
correct, this timeline underscores that high-order use of emotional
information, such as the ability to consciously evaluate the
contents of emotional representations held in memory for
recognition and naming, should be problematic or impossible
prior to 400 ms of information processing [17]. As well, one might
expect implicit priming of an emotional target stimulus by
congruent vocal cues to be absent or unstable if vocal primes
endure less than 400 ms, as has been reported recently [39,42,84].
This description is in alignment with our observation that
certain emotions are explicitly recognized and ‘‘isolated’’, on
average, in the 500–600 ms time window (possibly sooner, given
that our gating technique led only to approximate time measures).
Interestingly, response times for recognizing facial expressions of
emotion in the forced-choice task seem to fall in a similar time
window, ranging from 544 ms (happiness) to 669 ms (contempt)
following face onset [72]. Since emotion-specific knowledge about
vocal expressions is presumably activated ‘‘on-line’’ around 300–
400 milliseconds following speech onset, our data show that
conscious appraisal of these cues for naming can be accomplished
reliably with very little additional acoustic information for certain
emotions (fear, sadness, and possibly anger). On the other hand,
some emotions require protracted exposure and analysis before
they can be properly identified in speech (happiness, disgust).
From a biological and evolutionary perspective, our data supply
further indications that negative emotions, which signal threat,
aggression, and loss, are given precedence by the neurocognitive
system, allowing individuals to quickly respond in an appropriate
manner to an undesirable (vocal) stimulus [85,86]. The observa-
tion that fear was recognized faster, and ultimately better, than
other vocal expressions of basic emotion is noteworthy [65,66].
There are now well-defined neural systems, action tendencies, and
cognitive responses associated with aversive or threatening stimuli,
such as facial and vocal expressions of fear and anger [87,88,89].
The urgency to respond to fear-inducing stimuli, and the fact that
vocal signals of fear can be highly salient in the absence of joint
visual attention, may explain why these expressions are detected
very rapidly in the vocal channel, even when conscious evaluation
is required.
Since fearful voices are also highly distinctive in their acoustic-
perceptual form—exhibiting a higher mean pitch and faster
speech rate than other emotions [16,26]—it is possible that these
expressions are simpler to recognize at the perceptual level of
analysis, which promotes faster and more accurate detection of
fear in many processing environments (including the gating
paradigm). The same reason could explain why sadness, which
exhibits a distinct lack of acoustic variation and relatively slow
Recognizing Emotions in Speech
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 13 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27256
speech rate, is routinely recognized with great accuracy in speech
[26,43,67], and as demonstrated in this study, based on minimal
acoustic evidence. The idea that low-level physical characteristics
of fearful and sad expressions are more salient in the voice,
allowing their meanings to be detected relatively quickly, will
require further study; this hypothesis resembles similar explana-
tions for the ‘‘happiness advantage’’ observed in studies of
emotional face recognition (see [90] for a discussion).
In contrast to fear and sadness, anger took approximately
200 ms longer to recognize in our study. Since detecting anger is
also a matter of biological urgency, and these expressions are
typically recognized very well from the voice [26,43,48], the delay
in our timing measures in relation to fear/sadness may have been
influenced by the form of anger encoded by our vocal stimuli. The
angry utterances presented in this study conveyed ‘‘cold anger’’
(frustration) rather than ‘‘hot anger’’ (rage), and thus represented a
less intense form of anger with somewhat different vocal attributes
(see [91] for comparative data). Since differences in arousal play a
role in how well anger is recognized [26,68], this factor could
explain why extended cognitive analysis of angry expressions in
this study was necessary for our listeners, leading to later
recognition points for this emotion. This claim can be tested by
manipulating the intensity of emotional expressions in future
gating studies.
Considerably more time was needed for listeners to recognize
vocal expressions of happiness (,1000 ms) and disgust
(,1500 ms), which could relate to several factors. For happiness,
despite this being the only positively-valenced emotion in our
study, the lack of any advantage to recognize happy expressions
accurately is predicted by the literature [12,13,65,66], although
our data show that these difficulties extend to slower speed of
recognition [55]. Nonetheless, the emotional meanings of happy
expressions seem to be registered in memory enough to produce
category-specific priming effects, and modulation of the N400
component, after listening to prime stimuli lasting only 400 ms
[39] or 600 ms [42], preceding a congruent or incongruent facial
expression. Put together, this implies that happiness is recognized
implicitly like other emotions, but that conscious evaluation of
happy cues in speech requires prolonged exposure and greater
analysis when compared to most basic emotions. It should be
explored whether vocal cues signifying happiness require greater
cognitive analysis because there are actually different ‘‘kinds’’ of
happiness or positive emotions (e.g., contentment, amusement,
achievement, etc.) which can be discretely recognized at the stage
of conscious processing, each with a distinct acoustic signature
[62,92]. Also, based on evidence of how nonverbal emotional
vocalizations are categorized, it is possible that negative emotions
in the voice are recognized pan-culturally, whereas positive
emotions are communicated with culture-specific signals [92]. If
these principles govern how emotions are conveyed in the context
of speech, our data could exemplify that speakers provide acoustic
cues to the listener in a more localized manner, perhaps at the end
of an utterance [27], to mark their positive disposition and/or
affiliative intentions to the listener.
Finally, in the case of disgust which is a negatively-valenced
‘‘defensive’’ emotion, our data showcase that these expressions are
recognized very slowly (and with uncertainty) in speech. There is
previous evidence of specific attentional biases related to disgust;
for example, participants primed with disgust-related stories
demonstrated slower responses in a Stroop task [93], or had
difficulties disengaging from disgusting words [94]. An emotion-
specific attention bias which tends to delay behavioural responses
to disgusting stimuli could partly contribute to our findings.
Alternatively, it is likely that there are asymmetries in how well
disgust (and other emotions) are conveyed in specific communi-
cation channels; signals of disgust seem to be more salient in the
face [45] or when communicated by nonverbal vocalizations, or
vocal emblems (such as ‘‘eackk’’ or ‘‘eew’’, see [69,70]. The fact
that disgust was recognized slowly in our study may thus partly
reflect the atypicality of encountering disgust through isolated
vocal cues in speech, leading to difficulties for many listeners.
Overall, our new timing measures expand a growing database
which argues that vocal expressions of basic emotion possess
discrete acoustic-perceptual properties [13,16], activate category-
specific knowledge in emotional memory [7,34,39,95,96,97], and
are processed by partially distinct neurocognitive mechanisms
[36,98,99; cf 74]. Our investigation newly establishes that
processes leading to the explicit recognition of anger, disgust,
fear, sadness, and happiness are also associated with a unique time
course. This report serves as a foundation for future studies which
clarify how vocal emotion expressions evolve over time, and why
the recognition of basic emotions unfolds in a temporally distinct
manner in speech. At a methodological level, our study reinforces
the utility of auditory gating as an approach for studying emotions
in speech and for inferring when vocal emotion recognition occurs
(in reference to their ‘‘emotion identification point’’). As different
investigative approaches are combined to pinpoint when basic
emotions are recognized with even greater precision, the role of
socio-cultural factors in vocal emotion processing, and their
influence on timing, will also need to be addressed [34,100,101].
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